What Does the Anti-Corruption Drive in Saudi Arabia Mean?
He was said to be the favorite son of King Abdullah, who put him in charge of the National Guard in 2013. The former King of Saudi Arabia wanted to groom Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud to take over the throne. Instead, the man who would be king experienced the humiliation of paying a $1.0-billion bribe—or a ransom, if you will—to get out of jail and continue playing the Riyadh version of “Monopoly.”
Mutaib’s more famous cousin, Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz al Saud, remains in the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton hotel—turned prison for the occasion—in mysterious circumstances. American mercenaries have allegedly tortured him.
Even though the rumors of torture make little sense, there’s no doubt Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MbS) is intent on seeing his “anti-corruption” effort to completion. It could be fruitful, earning the Kingdom some $100.0 billion by the time it’s over. But the Ritz may remain fully booked for a few months yet. (Source: “Saudi Arabia’s Arab Spring, at Last,” November 23, 2017.)
As influential as Al-Waleed may be (or may have been) in the United States and on Wall Street—Microsoft’s Bill Gates recently praised him—he was never in the running for the throne. He has the most to lose in the anti-corruption drive because he wields more financial than political power. And only the right amount of dollars can get him out now.
What’s Happening in Saudi Arabia Is Much Bigger Than Any Prince’s Net Worth
Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman’s purge appears to be the first salvo in a merciless battle to change the Kingdom. Some, like Thomas Friedman, have even dared call it a “Spring,” and a “top-down” one, at that. (Source: The New York Times, op cit.)
But, Friedman’s mellifluous musings about progress and “markets” have been wrong time and time again. Friedman has the right idea, alright. MbS has inaugurated a new season in the Kingdom, but it’s hardly spring. It’s more like the fall, just before the winter in Alaska.
MbS is going after power. He’s eliminating competition to the throne using the shame of corruption to do it. That’s his stick, while the promise of reform, Friedman gushes, is the carrot. But there’s no need for the carrot any longer. The arrested princes and Al-Waleed have associates in the West. Few have come out to support him, except for a muted statement from Gates.
The problem is that their friends will not speak publicly of MbS’s campaign. It would hurt their Saudi interests in the longer term to criticize the man who is pulling off a virtual, if unofficial, palace coup. It’s true that King Salman may try to alter the Saudi economy by diversifying from oil. But he did not suddenly come up with that plan one night while praying on a lonely mountain like the prophets the Middle East is so good at producing.
Anti-Corruption Drive Could Have Some Success, But for How Long?
The anti-corruption arrests may even succeed. They could dismantle the veritable system that has allowed royals and Saudi businessmen to enrich themselves by skimming from government contracts and multinational deals. But for how long? And for how long does MbS expect to continue his purge, while his army and air force are engaged in a horrible and completely asymmetrical war in Yemen?
Credits: Etienne Oliveau/Getty Images
This is no reform. Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman is merely concentrating his power, undermining his rivals and identifying his enemies. The Ritz-Carlton arrests will yield some important hints as to the risks that MbS will have to confront. If MbS really wants to change the system, he must do much more than that. The corruption proceeds are an essential component of the welfare machine. It distributes the benefits of the oil wealth to various societal groups, even if the elites got the most benefit.
Oil prices and alternative energy are threatening the survival of the Kingdom. Economic growth in the past decade was not great. The population has a large percentage of youth, a quarter of whom are unemployed or underemployed. Clearly, less oil revenue to finance the budget and more hands stretched out to receive their “allowances” fuels social tensions. Meanwhile, the extent of the Saudi involvement in funding and stoking the flames of instability in Syria—and elsewhere—won’t be lost on its neighbors.
Some, like Saudi Arabia, are waiting for Riyadh to take the wrong step. Not surprisingly, in the context of intensifying competition for regional leadership, the Saudis are feeling scared. That’s why they have signed contracts to buy some $350.0-billion worth of American weapons in the next few years. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia’s international adventures, whether Syria, Yemen—and possibly Lebanon—have not produced a single benefit for its interests.
For all the talk of reform, modernizing the economy, curbing the edge from Wahhabi Islam and containing Iran, MbS cannot expect that holding up some of the most privileged people in the world in a five-star prison for a few weeks will be sufficient. MbS may succeed in ruling according to his vision. He could be an enlightened king in the same way that enlightened princes have ruled more justly and wisely in pre-French Revolution Europe, occasionally.
Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman could also have triggered a season of much greater internal political instability in a context just beginning to digest the last major regional war. Of course, green energy or not, the world still runs on oil for the time being. Instability in Saudi Arabia could translate into unpleasant consequences for the global economy and peace.